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ABSTRACT: The Dutch education system relies upon a large number of publicly-subsidized, 
denominational schools. The authors defend the importance ofschools that educate children within a 
specific - including denominational - conception fthe good by arguing for the importance of such 
a conception for the development of he child's identity. An essential component of this developmen- 
tal process i critical reflection, conceived ascrucial to the formation of moral autonomy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The existence of Christian schools and Christian education is widely discussed in 
Dutch society. The strategy of dividing schools according to different denomina- 
tions, a practice which started with the Pacification Law of 1917 and has continued 
for so many decades, is losing its impact. Given the condition of contemporary 
Dutch society, the enormous decline in the number of church members and the 
pace at which Christian organisations and institutions disappear, the reasons for the 
existence of denominational schools are questioned, too. The discussion about the 
need for denominational schools is not unique to the Netherlands, but takes place 
in almost all Western countries. In many countries, it is, for instance, questioned 
whether the state is obliged to subsidize private or denominational schools. 
In this article, we will defend the importance of schools that educate pupils 
within a specific conception of the good by illustrating the importance of this kind 
of education for the development of a child's identity. Though our focus is more 
specifically on denominational schools, we regard our conclusions as valid for all 
kinds of private schools as well as public schools in which a specific conception of 
the good is explicitly actualized. In the second and third sections, we will deal with 
the problem of defining identity and then give some thought to the development of
identity and the role and function of schools in the development of the child's iden- 
tity. ]Finally, the fourth section sketches two conceivable problems certain denomi- 
national schools will meet in their contribution to the child's identity development. 
II. IDENTITY 
A person's elf-image and identity cannot develop without others. Psychologists, 
for instance, Mead (1934), as well as philosophers uch as Taylor (1989), have 
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demonstrated that a person's ense of herself requires ignificant others. It is only 
within the mirror of the other that one can learn and see what kind of a person 
one is. Only within an intersubjective or dialogic relation can one develop one's 
subjectivity. As Taylor claims, the development of one's identity needs inescapable 
horizons, and only those characteristics that gain importance against inescapable 
horizons become part of one's identity (Taylor, 1992, p. 37). But what is meant 
by a person's 'identity' ? 
The concept 'identity' is not only widely used within scientific as well as 
common sense language, but it also has a wide variety of meanings. Different 
conceptions of 'identity' are proposed by philosophers and psychologists. Our 
analysis is based on Flanagan's definition of 'actual full identity', which he dis- 
tinguishes from self-represented identity (1991). Actual full identity ".. .  is con- 
stituted by the dynamic integrated system of past and present identifications, 
desires, commitments, aspirations, beliefs, dispositions, temperament, roles, acts, 
and actional patterns, as well as by whatever self-understandings (even incorrect 
ones) each person brings into his or her life" (Flanagan, 1991, p. 135). This 
identity is not static, but can alter due to changes in the centrality of the different 
aspects or due to changes in the aspects themselves. It is "the self as seen from 
the point of view of a certain class of theoretical perspectives that admit the 
reality of the self as an emergent phenomenon a d try to give an objective account 
of what it, in general and particular, is like" (ibid., p. 137). Within the enumera- 
tion of the different elements of actual full identity, we can distinguish three 
clusters of aspects. Though these clusters can be discerned theoretically, in prac- 
tice, they influence one another and form a dynamic system. 
The first cluster of identity aspects consists of the characteristics related to the 
person himself, that is, of his biological and psychological characteristics. These 
include the characteristics of his body, for instance, being big or fat; the character- 
istics of his temperament, for instance, being hot-tempered, shy or melancholic; 
and psychological characteristics, such as being aggressive. Secondly, the person 
will have ideals regarding these characteristics oncerning the kind of person she 
wants to be or concerning the kind of looks she would like to have. These ideals 
influence her evaluation of her own characteristics and thereby form her identity. 
A person's identity consists, in the second place, of the self-ascription of char- 
acteristics, values and ideals derived from the different communities the person 
is part of, for instance, a family, a peer group, a group of friends, working com- 
munity, church, ethnic group. The communities that a person is part of and that 
constitute her identity can thus be larger and more general, as well as small and 
highly particular. An example of the relevant characteristics are those a person 
ascribes to herself in relation to the roles she has in these communities; exam- 
ples include being a mother, a scientist, a church-member, or a member of a 
soccer team. 
Within the communities to which she belongs, there will be (moral) values 
and (moral) ideals that will form her identity, such as the values that rule her 
profession or the values of the particular church of which she is a member. She 
will also have certain ideals regarding her role in a particular community in rela- 
tion to which she evaluates herself and which become part of her identity. These 
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may include being a good mother, because she is always at home for tea when 
the children arrive from school. 
The values and ideals of the various communities that a person endorses con- 
stitute his conception of the good. According to Rawls, a conception of the good 
consists of "a determinate scheme of final ends and aims, and of desires that 
certain persons and associations as objects of attachments and loyalties should 
flourish. Also included in such a conception is a view of our relation to the 
world - religious, philosophical or moral - by reference to which these ends and 
attachments are understood" (Rawls, 1987, p. 16). 
The third cluster of identity aspects consists of characteristics, values and 
ideals which a person derives from the society of which he is a part. A person in 
a liberal democratic society, for instance, will regard himself as being a free 
citizen who has the possibility of voting for and, thereby, influencing the govern- 
ment and who has certain rights and duties relating to the government and fellow 
citizens. His identity will also be influenced by the values and (non) moral ideals 
of the society of which he is a member. In a liberal democratic society, the moral 
values a person as a citizen can ascribe to himself are part of the so-called public 
morality. Public morality consists of basic rules and basic rights. Basic rules are 
the necessary foundation for every livable society. Basic rules are necessary due 
to the natural characteristics of human beings, for instance, limited altruism and 
human vulnerability, and to the world in which we live (Hart, 1963). In order to 
be able to five well together, people have to follow basic rules such as not to steal, 
not to murder, to help people in distressing situations if the costs are not detri- 
mental to the helper's ituation. Basic rights are constitutive of a liberal democ- 
ratic society. They include the classic civil liberties, for instance, the right to 
freedom of speech and the fight not to be discriminated against as well as the 
basic political democratic rights, such as the right to vote and the fight to run for 
public office (cf. Spiecker & Steutel, 1995). 
We have stated that the aspects of identity can influence one another. This is 
not to be thought of as a self-governing or subconscious process. Not only can a 
person observe changes, he can also reflect critically on either of the aspects. The 
reflection "... involves articulating tensions between our ideals and other aspects 
of identity; it involves evaluating the aims and attachments that are embedded in
the social aspects of identity" (Rorty & Wong, 1993, p. 30). Though it is not 
necessary for having an identity that persons can contemplate every aspect, from 
the perspective of personal autonomy, we conceive of a critical reflection on the 
aspects of identity as an ideal worth striving for in education. So, this ideal of 
critical reflection brings us to the ideal of autonomy. The ideal goal of a child's 
development and the aim of education is to become autonomous. In the next 
section we will elaborate on this aim and the way in which this can be achieved. 
lII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDENTITY 
The aim of a child's development within a liberal society should be the develop- 
ment of an autonomous person. We describe an autonomous person as someone 
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who pursues elf-chosen goals and relationships. An autonomous person lives a 
life freely chosen (cf. Raz, 1989). One of the defenses that can be given for this 
ideal aim is that, in our liberal, pluralistic society, being autonomous i  neces- 
sary for one's well-being. Such a society is so arranged that being able to make 
autonomous choices and act autonomously is necessary for flourishing (cf. Raz, 
1989; White, 1990). Since autonomy or autonomous identity is heavily debated 
and has received ivergent interpretations, we will explicate our conception of 
the identity of an autonomous person and the way in which it develops. 
A necessary condition for having an autonomous identity is that one is able to 
reflect critically on the aspects of ones identity, also on the traditions or frame- 
works in which one has been raised. We have stated that a person's ubjective 
identity can only arise in an intersubjective situation, that is, in a community. 
Stating that a person has to reflect on this critically by no means implies that the 
person should abandon the community or that he could not be related to any 
community or tradition at all. Being part of a community or society allows a 
person's life to flourish. However, the way in which he or she is a member of the 
community should not be all-encompassing or non-critical, but reflective. Our 
ideal is, thus, not a kind of unencumbered self, which Sandel attacks (cf. Rorty & 
Wong, 1993), but the ideal of an autonomous person which liberals such as 
Kymlicka (1991) and Flanagan (1991, 1993), and critical sociologists uch as 
Habermas (1973) describe. 
Parents are the first persons in relation to whom a child can develop its identity. 
The way in which they respond to the child and emphasize certain characteris- 
tics of the child is the first and, probably, the most important step in a person's 
identity formation. By their responses, they influence the first cluster of identity 
aspects. Clearly, parents influence the second cluster of aspects of the child's 
identity as well. By imparting to the child the values and ideals of the family and 
those of the communities of which the family is a member, parents influence the 
ideal identity of the child. Thirdly, parents will influence the formation of the cit- 
izenship cluster of identity aspects. 
What role can or should schools have in the development of the child's iden- 
tity? Schools are communities in which the child participates for at least twelve 
years, for about seven hours a day. Therefore, it is not an understatement to claim 
that the school community has an important influence on the development of a 
child's identity. Within schools, fellow pupils and the formation of peer groups 
contribute to a child's identity. Teachers, however, will have as much influence, 
not only by direct education, but also by the way in which they behave in social 
situations, the way in which they support he child if he is outcast or the way in 
which they correct a child's behavior in relation to other children. 
Teachers, especially in primary schools, will have an influence on the devel- 
opment of the child's identity with respect o biological and psychological 
aspects. Not only should teachers be aware of this, they should also take a pro- 
fessional attitude in this matter. A primary school teacher who constantly humil- 
iates pupils he does not think bright by referring to their stupidity or mistakes is 
unprofessional in the execution of his pedagogical task. Instead of enhancing the 
SCHOOLS, IDENTITY AND THE CONCEPTION OF THE GOOD 31 
positive identity and the self-esteem of these pupils, he endows them with a neg- 
ative sense of themselves. 
In the formation of the second cluster of identity aspects, various philosophers 
(of education) claim that a child needs a stable primary culture or framework 
(see, for example, Taylor, 1989, 1992). A child needs values and ideals with which 
it can identify or which it can reject in the formation of her identity. So, the child 
has to be raised within a situation in which parents and teachers hold a conception 
of the good, live according to it, and share that conception with the child. Teachers 
and the school community can and will influence the child's formation of his 
conception of the good, that is, the values and ideals the child comprises within 
his identity. This claim is valid not only for denominational schools, but for all 
schools that educate xplicitly within a specific conception of the good. Within 
our multicultural society, it is all the more important that children are provided 
with frameworks within which they can form their identity. It is true for adults 
that "with total freedom, there can be no individual freedom.., because an excess 
of choice impairs the will" (Frankfurt, 1993, p. 19). Thus, Frankfurt claims, 
adults need ideals that restrict heir freedom. If this is true for adults, as we think 
it is, it is especially true for children. Moreover, loss of ideals can lead to the dis- 
appearance of the meaning of life. This could lead young people to end their 
lives, because ameaningless life is a senseless life. 
One of the core concerns of the school is to teach children the values and 
ideals of society and the characteristics of citizenship. We will describe this task 
of the school within the range of our liberal democratic society. Following Rawls, 
citizens in a liberal democratic society should have two moral powers. The first 
is having a capacity for a sense of justice, that is, "the capacity to understand, to 
apply and normally to be moved by an effective desire to act from the principles 
of justice as the fair terms of social cooperation". The second is having a capac- 
ity for a conception of the good, that is, "the capacity to form, to revise, and 
rationally to pursue such a conception" (Rawls, 1987, p. 16). We claim that these 
two capacities hould be part of a citizen's identity in a liberal democratic 
society. This means that, in schools, children should be introduced into contents 
and competencies needed for the capacities mentioned. 
IV. FOCUS ON DENOMINATIONAL SCHOOLS 
Now that we have shown that schools contribute to the development of a child's 
identity, we will finally give some thought o two possible frictions between the 
aim we think education should strive for, namely, an autonomous person and the 
denominational character of a school. 
The first friction is that between the crucial aspect of being an autonomous 
person, that is, critical reflection on the aspects of one's identity including one's 
conception of the good, on the one hand, and the opinion within some religious 
tradirons that doubt or the revision of religious principles, values and norms is 
blasphemous and, hence, could not be part of education at all, on the other. A 
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specific conception of the good will be present in denominational schools, and 
could even be dominant. However, teachers hould also encourage children to 
think critically about the conception of the good in which they are raised. At 
least, teachers hould make children aware of different kinds of conceptions that 
exist within their society and for which the children ought to have respect. This 
means that teachers hould start a dialogue between themselves and the pupils 
and should encourage the pupils to discuss with their peers their conception of 
the good. Children have to acquire a disposition to be interested in the concep- 
tion of the good of others, at least he ones with which they are confronted in their 
own society. This means that children need to have a notion of what a concep- 
tion of the good is. Only at a later age will children be able to have this concept 
reflectively, but, in primary schools, teachers can already start o encourage chil- 
dren to listen to stories of other cultures and religions, to tolerate children with 
other conceptions, and to learn to respect them. Thus, while at an early age, due 
to the cognitive and psychological tools of the child, education will consist pri- 
marily of initiating children into the ideas and practices of a certain conception 
of the good. This has to be done with the aim of autonomy in mind. 
In 'closed' denominational schools, education obviously does not meet this 
standard; critical reflection on the specific onception of the good is not regarded 
as a valuable aim at all. On the contrary, instead of striving for autonomy, these 
schools strive for heteronomy, that is, for a non-critical, self-contained person. 
The second friction is that of the school's duty to contribute, simultaneously, 
to the formation of a conception of the good and to the education of a child's 
identity as a citizen in a liberal society. Within a liberal democratic society, a 
citizen's identity has to consist of the characteristics of a liberal democratic 
citizen. This implies that children should learn about and be stimulated to follow 
the basic rules and basic rights of such a society and that they should be able to 
develop a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the 
good. This presupposes that in schools the basic rules and basic rights are upheld 
and that the two capacities mentioned are actualized by the teachers as examples 
for the children. In schools in which a very conservative conception of the good 
is stimulated, for instance, in fundamentalist Christian or Islamic schools, there 
will be a tension between communitarian values and societal values. For example, 
in the Netherlands, some highly traditional denominational schools teach girls 
that they have to fulfil a certain role, that their identity should be one of being a 
housewife and mother and, most certainly, not one of being a political citizen. 
This, of course, is a violation of the basic right not to be discriminated against. 
Also, in these kinds of schools, the child's possibility for developing the second 
moral power, that is, to have the capacity for a conception of the good, is res- 
tricted because, as we mentioned with respect o the first friction, these schools 
condemn reflection on the specific conception of the good. 
Towards both frictions we take a position similar to that of Amy Gutmann, 
who wrote, "The same principle that requires a state to grant personal and polit- 
ical freedom also commits it to assuring children an education that makes those 
two freedoms both possible and meaningful in the future" (Gntmann, 1987, p. 30). 
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Thus, the Dutch government has to reflect on the freedom of education in our 
country. It is doubtful whether schools that cannot resolve the frictions in a way 
that meets the criteria for a development towards autonomous identity, which we 
have said to be in the child's interest in our society, should be granted - without 
further discussion - freedom and full subsidy as they have them today. 
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